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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

MEMO NO. : 100-764 of 17 June 1964

SUBJECT: Industrial Youth Groups

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

MEMO NO.: 1586/66

SUBJECT: Indonesian Youth Groups

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: To D/OCI: Suggest routine internal and external dissemination.

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INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE AID

INDONESIAN YOUTH GROUPS

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
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No. 1586/66

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
29 June 1966

INTELLIGENCE REFERENCE AID\*

Indonesian Youth Groups

Introduction

Non-Communist Indonesian student groups played a significant role in the massive purge of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) following the abortive Communist-oriented coup on 1 October 1965. They also helped create the climate which made possible the subsequent curtailment of President Sukarno's power. In performing these functions, the student groups displayed an unprecedented degree of unity, and more normal divisive tendencies now are beginning to reassert themselves. Student and youth elements mirror their parent political and religious groups in their complexity and diversity; under normal circumstances, they cannot of themselves be said to constitute a coherent, unified national political force. However, another national crisis could cause them to submerge their differences again to push for specific common objectives.

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a brief background on the role of student and youth groups in the Indonesian nationalist movement and to assess the current status and alignments of the major groups now operating.

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\*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence

Background

1. Student and youth groups have been active in Indonesia since the early days of the preindependence nationalist movement. Their significance increased during the Japanese occupation and the subsequent four-year struggle against the Dutch. After independence was achieved, they maintained themselves and even proliferated.
2. Most of these groups are affiliates of political parties, and as such they reflect the three major orientations that are found in Indonesian political life--religion, nationalism, and socialism or Marxism.
3. Prior to October 1965, the three major Indonesian parties were the Moslem Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian National Party (PNI), and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). President Sukarno's gradual move toward the left facilitated the growth and influence of Communist and leftist national groups while moderate nationalist and religious groups found themselves increasingly on the defensive. In 1963 the move to the left greatly intensified, and by mid-1965 only the army offered resistance--and that was relatively slight--to the nation's move into a Sukarnoized version of Communism.
4. Communist elements were deeply involved in the abortive coup of 1 October 1965, and the army used this involvement to justify a campaign to destroy the PKI. The most active support for the army's anti-Communist program came from the religious--predominantly Moslem--youth and student groups. Sometimes spontaneously and sometimes with army encouragement, youth and students demonstrated or took physical action against the Communists, Communist Chinese installations, and the Overseas Chinese community.
5. By December 1965 the PKI and its front groups, including the Communist youth front, Pemuda Rakjat, had been destroyed as overt national organizations. Army leaders and their supporters believed they should turn their attention to reorganizing the

government and attacking economic problems. Again the youth groups were in the forefront in dramatizing the need for reform. In March 1966 the students briefly emerged as a highly significant political force, having been a major factor in preparing the way for army demands to Sukarno which, in turn, resulted in a reorganization of the government.

6. The unity that characterized the anti-Communist student movement from October through March, however, now is giving way to internal dissension and fragmentation. With the PKI rendered ineffective and the government at least partially reorganized, anti-Communist elements are thinking in terms of strengthening their respective roles within the general political movement. Dissension appears to have begun within the youth movement and is spreading into the political parties themselves.

7. Present disputes both within and among youth groups and political parties are fragmenting the support available to military and civilian government leaders and complicating their task of recasting Indonesian domestic and foreign policy. Present domestic complexities, however, are likely to characterize the Indonesian scene for the foreseeable future.

#### Major Student and Youth Groups

8. The following is a descriptive list of today's major youth and student organizations, grouped according to their religious, nationalist, or socialist orientations. It attempts to show those groups that were important after the coup attempt and their major activities, and points out the present sources of contention which are causing realignment of loyalties, revival of old antagonisms, and intraparty feuding, factors which have always been much a part of Indonesian political life. For the most part membership figures have been omitted since there are few available and they are often open to question.

NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS

(Both KAMI and KAPPI, although drawing their strength from religious youth organizations, appear to regard themselves as nationally rather than religiously motivated. Official guidance and support appear to have come from the army and from Deputy Prime Minister Adam Malik, one of Indonesia's triumvirs.)

KAMI--University Students Action Command ("Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia"). This is a confederation of Indonesia's university student groups which grew out of the anti-Communist movement following the 1 October incident and appears to have been organized in December 1965. It has a rotating leadership; the present secretary general is Kosmos Batubara, who is also chairman of The Catholic University Students Association. The bulk of KAMI membership is made up of Moslem and Catholic elements.

KAMI proved to be quite effective in the Djakarta area but less so in Central and East Java owing to the pro-Sukarno and pro-leftist sympathies of police and army units in the area. It now has been generally accepted that KAMI in the Djakarta area had the early support and encouragement of the army, which protected KAMI demonstrations and supplied the students with certain small arms.

Although the government's assessment of the hard-core membership of KAMI in February 1966 was only 7,500, the group was effective in rallying thousands of students and gaining the support of many labor and professional groups.

President Sukarno banned the organization as of 26 February, but KAMI simply refused to accept this, and the ban did little to restrict its activities. Many members melded into the high school counterpart, KAPPI, and took a strong role in guiding its activities during this period. In the Surabaya area, following the ban, KAMI elements formed the Progressive Revolutionary Students Cooperation Group (PRSCG) which was, in effect, merely

a renaming of the organization. The only KAMI member group failing to participate was the local branch of the Christian University Students Movement. On the whole, the PRSCG proved rather ineffectual in the face of strong opposition from the National Students Movement and the military.

With the reorganization of the Indonesian cabinet and the downgrading of Sukarno in March, KAMI resumed activities under its own name.

KAPPI--Secondary School Students Action Command ("Kesatuan Aksi Perhimpunan Perhimpunan Indonesia") is the high school counterpart of KAMI. It became particularly active when KAMI was banned, and it worked in close unison with moderate university student forces. The bulk of its membership, like that of KAMI, was made up of Moslem and Catholic forces. Although quite effective in carrying out its programs in the Djakarta area, it suffered the same difficulties as KAMI in Central and East Java in the face of military antagonisms, leftist, pro-Sukarno sentiment, and competition from other Moslem groups.

It has recently suffered from an internal feud that threatened to spread throughout the entire student movement, affecting KAMI and other organizations as well.

Factionalism was prompted in late May when a proposal by the Islamic Students (PII) for a permanent committee to govern KAPPI, rather than a rotating committee, was rejected. Other groups saw this proposal as a threat by a single Moslem group to take over the organization.

On 25 May the PII was expelled from KAPPI on charges that it was trying to intimidate and dominate KAPPI. The situation was further aggravated by the arrest on 28 May of former KAPPI chairman Husni Thamrin, a member of the PII and a vehement anti-Sukarnoite. During this period PII was supported by the Moslem university student group and student affiliates of the National Party. ANSOR and Catholic factions stood in opposition, and the Protestant students took a neutral stand.

Recent reporting has announced a settlement of the conflict, largely in favor of the PII. A charter of unity signed by member groups on 13 June reinstated Husni Thamrin as KAPPI chairman.

GMNI--Indonesian National Students Movement ("Gerkan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia"). This is the university students' affiliate of the Indonesian National Party (PNI). During the period following the attempted coup, the GMNI was aligned with the leftist, pro-Sukarno Ali-Surachman faction of the PNI, which brought it into direct confrontation with Moslem forces.

Factionalism within the PNI led to a victory for the moderate Osa-Usep group, led by Osa Maliki and Usep Ranuwidjaja, and brought about a realignment of GMNI elements. A newly aligned GMNI in East Java split from the leftist faction of the PNI and pledged its support, within reason, to KAMI. On 24 May the GMNI formally renounced its affiliation with the leftist PNI, and on 25 May the new general chairman of the Surabaya branch, Imam Santoso, declared that "all GMNI members now are members of KAMI and support all KAMI programs and actions provided they benefit the people."

However, the realignment of the GMNI is by no means completed. Die-hard leftist elements, apparently infiltrated by the PKI, are violently challenging moderates in the Jogjakarta area where the issue is still centered around supremacy for Sukarno rather than party maneuvering for political advantage.

This new development casts some doubt on how far the new GMNI leadership will be able to go. It is not completely loyal to KAMI, and its cooperation will probably always be limited, especially since KAMI in East Java is dominated by Moslem students.

BANRA--The GMNI paramilitary organization, presumably drawn from militant youth elements within the organization. They reportedly were armed and trained by leftist military units of the police and marines.

Pemuda Pantjasila ("Youth of the Five Pillars") is the youth affiliate of IPKI, the Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence, a minor political party with strong army connections. The Pemuda Pantjasila was particularly active in PKI purges and anti-PKI and anti-Chinese demonstrations in North Sumatra after 1 October.

At present it is in some danger of being eclipsed by other, more significant groups in the current scramble for political advantage.

GERMINDO--Indonesian University Students Movement ("Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia"), is an affiliate of Partai Indonesia (Partindo), a party which has been Communist-penetrated almost since its inception in the 1950s. GERMINDO must be assumed to be similarly infiltrated. It was active through mid-March of this year during the period of Sukarno's brief comeback, and as late as May, its East Java headquarters appears to have been a center for clandestine PKI activities in that area. In mid-May the East Java Partindo and GERMINDO were banned. Members will presumably work with Communist youth to develop an underground organization.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

ANSOR--The youth affiliate of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Party, the Moslem Scholars' Party. Although active throughout Java and North Sumatra, it has most of its strength in East Java, where it has taken a strong anti-PKI, anti-Chinese position. Before 1 October, ANSOR took a far more forthright anti-Communist position than did its parent organization, the NU, which has a long record of opportunism.

ANSOR youth elements participated in and sometimes led the bloody purges of the PKI in East Java. They also took advantage of the situation to move against other opposition elements, including members of the leftist faction of the National Party (PNI).

The bloodbaths antagonized marine (KKO) and police (Mobrig) elements in the area, since members of these units were strongly pro-Sukarno and many had relatives in the PKI and PNI who were lost in the purges. Military support for leftist nationalists in the area has added to present complexities in East Java.

In recent weeks ANSOR has been feuding with other Moslem youth groups. If it follows the lead of the NU it can be expected--particularly in East Java, an area of strong pro-Sukarno sentiment--to swing more in line with this sentiment as one means of maintaining an ascendancy over other Moslem organizations.

BANSER--The NU's paramilitary organization, presumably drawn from militant elements of ANSOR. It has been principally mentioned as active in East Java and North Sumatra.

HMI--Moslem University Students Association ("Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam")--is a leading member organization of KAMI, the confederation of university student organizations. The student affiliate of the banned Masjumi Party, HMI retained its legality and has maintained an effective organization. Its strong anti-PKI position never led it to the extremes of ANSOR.



HMI elements have been most effective in the Djakarta area where they have been a guiding force in general student activity. They have been active but relatively ineffective in Surabaya, East Java. Countered by ANSOR and the leftist sympathies of marine and police units in that area, they have been forced into competitive tactics and have been unable to concentrate on their own objectives of political and economic reform.

In May and June the HMI found itself involved in a dispute over control of KAPPI, the confederation of high school students, and has sided with its high school counterpart, the PII.

PII--Islamic Students of Indonesia ("Peladjar Islam Indonesia")--is the still-legal high-school-student affiliate of the banned Masjumi Party. It is the largest and one of the most militant of high school groups and--until its expulsion last May--was the largest single group within KAPPI, the confederation of high school student organizations.

Following its expulsion, clashes--involving kidnappings and beatings--between its members and ANSOR youths threatened the entire moderate student movement with factionalism. Masjumi affiliates, supported by IPKI, an army-supported political party, backed the PII while NU and Catholic elements stood in opposition. The moderate Osa-Usep faction of the PNI, sympathetic to the Masjumi elements, refrained from taking an active stand. It remains to be seen just how effective the present settlement will prove to be.

PKRI--Catholic Students Association of the Republic of Indonesia ("Perhimpunan Katholik Republic Indonesia"). The high school affiliate of the Catholic Party (PK), it forms one of the larger and more influential groups within KAPPI and, along with the Moslem students, was instrumental in leading the protest activities in Djakarta.

Sukarno accused both it and the HMI of being dupes of the US Central Intelligence Agency and threatened both groups with dissolution. Despite the fact that

the Catholic Party is a minor party in Indonesian politics, the PKRI and its university counterpart wield an influence on the student scene out of proportion to that of their parent organization.

PMKRI--Catholic University Students Association of the Republic of Indonesia ("Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia")--is the university affiliate of the Catholic Party and one of the stronger elements within KAMI. It is especially strong in West Java where, along with other moderate and rightist student movements, it enjoyed military sympathy and tacit military support. Its chairman, Kosmos Batubara, is also currently secretary general of KAMI.

GMKI--Christian University Students Movement ("Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia")--is an affiliate of the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), a minor party in Indonesian politics, and the party of the Protestant Christian minority. The GMKI, while a member organization of KAMI, failed to take any effective role in that organization. It participated in anti-Communist Djakarta demonstrations during the early post-October period but has been considerably less active since then. In other parts of Indonesia it had even less influence than in Djakarta.

SOCIALIST/MARXIST ORGANIZATIONS

CGMI (banned)--Concentration of Indonesian University Students Movements ("Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia")--is controlled by the PKI. Most of its members are believed to be non-Communist, but it is suspected of having been a proving ground for young Communists and an active recruiting arm for new members. It was banned early in 1966; many of its overt activities were taken over by GERMINDO.

Since 1 October, the CGMI has proved most effective in East Java where marine and police units were sympathetic to the leftist position.

Pemuda Rakjat (banned)--Peoples Youth--is the youth affiliate of the PKI. Before 1 October, it was active in leading demonstrations and infiltrating other student organizations. After the coup it apparently lost a sizable number of its members in the Army-Moslem purges of the party and its front groups. It was officially banned in March along with the PKI and other front organizations. Many of its members reportedly went into the CGMI and GERMINDO. At its peak, Pemuda Rakjat claimed three million members. It is now said to be developing an underground organization.

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